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CHAPTER 6 
Contracts 
FREDERICK M. HART 
§6.1. Covenants not to compete. In the 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY, at-
tention was called to the large number of cases involving covenants 
not to compete.1 In that year most of the litigation pitted employer 
against employee.2 During the 1964 SURVEY year two cases in which 
the buyer of a business attempted to enforce a covenant not to com-
pete are worth noting. A third case,s decided in 1962, is also included 
as it provides the necessary background for one of this year's decisions. 
Whether a covenant not to compete should be implied in the sale 
of stock was discussed at length by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Tobin v. Cody. during the 1962 term. In that case a long-established 
and friendly business relationship was terminated in an amicable 
settlement when the defendant sold the plaintiff his stock in the cor-
poration. After six years the defendant began a competing business. 
The plaintiff-buyer brought an action to enjoin the defendant from 
competing, and the Court upheld an injunction granted below. 
The Court recognized the close connection between the good will 
of a business and a covenant not to compete. It held that even though 
the good will ofa corporation belongs to the corporate entity, there are 
situations in which the sale of stock by a stockholder carries with it a 
transfer of the good will. The primary test of whether a covenant 
not to compete should be implied is whether the covenant is necessary 
to give to the purchaser what was sold to him. Among the criteria to 
be considered in a particular case are the following: whether the seller 
was an active participant in the business, whether he held a position 
with the company that gave him the opportunity to control or affect 
the good will, the number of shares outstanding, and the connection 
between the name of the seller and the name of the business. 
A similar case, Cap's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Caproni,5 was decfded during 
the 1964 SURVEY year. The Court had little difficulty in fitting the 
case into the general mold of Tobin v. Cody. The only distinguishing 
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factor was that in Cap's Auto Parts the circumstances surrounding the 
sale of stock were distinctly unfriendly, and the settlement had an 
undercurrent of bitterness. The Court did not attach any significance 
to this difference, but it does seem to be of importance. When a 
settlement is friendly, it may well be that the buyer reasonably assumes 
that the seller will not compete with him and that the law should find 
an implied-in-fact promise by the seller to that effect. When, however, 
the transaction is marked by hard bargaining, it is more reasonable to 
expect that the covenant not to compete would have been extracted 
from the seller if this had been part of the deal. The Court in Cap's 
A uto Parts did note that the seller indicated his intention to retire, 
and it may be that this finding gave rise to the implication of the 
covenant. 
Sulmonetti v. Hayest> marks the furthest that the courts have gone 
in allowing an injunction to run against strangers to a covenant not 
to compete. Frank Hayes operated a fuel oil business with his father 
and continued the business after his father's death. His wife Emily 
actively assisted Frank in the office after the death of his father. The 
business floundered, and Frank sold out to Sulmonetti, a separate 
consideration of $10,000 being paid to Frank for his covenant not to 
compete. Emily was not a party and may not have known of the 
covenant before it was actually signed. Two years later Emily formed 
an oil company under a new name. She was the sole stockholder, 
president, and treasurer. Emily, even when she had worked for the 
prior business, had shown considerably more business acumen and 
capability than Frank. The Court found that Frank "deliberately 
and willfully" connived with Emily, although exactly what form this 
"connivance" took is not indicated. On suit by the vendee to enforce 
the covenant specifically the Supreme Judicial Court had no difficulty 
in enjoining Frank from activity breaching his covenant, but Emily 
presented a different situation. 
The evidence did not bring the case within the recognizably en-
joinable conduct of strangers to the covenant, such as when the vendor 
uses the third person as an agent, or the third person is the vendor in 
colorably altered form, or the third person induces the vendor to 
breach his covenant.7 The Supreme Judicial Court, however, rested 
its affirmance of the injunction on the "deliberate and willful" con-
nivance with Frank. Invoking the basic principle of fair dealing with 
a vendee, the Court found Emily's conduct to be in derogation of the 
good will that the vendee had purchased. 
§6.2. Liquidated damages. When a contract provides that a de-
faulting party shall pay the entire price as damages, this has the mark 
of a penalty clause.1 This is especially true when the circumstances 
make it impossible or impractical for the breaching party to accept 
61964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 693, 198 N.E.2d 297, also noted in §5.7 supra. 
7See Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125 (1901). 
§6.2. 1 McCormick, The Law of Damages §149 (1935). 
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the bargained-for benefit. Daley v. ]. F. White Contracting CO.,2 
decided during the 1964 SURVEY year, is an interesting variant to this 
general rule. 
In the Daley case the defendant agreed to take 100,000 yards of 
"borrow and fill" from the plaintiff's land during a twenty-month 
period and to leave the property graded. The defendant was to pay 
$15,000 for this right. The contract also provided that "in the event 
that ... [the defendant] has not removed the 100,000 yards, he shall 
then pay for said amount ... and be allowed an extra month to remove 
it after the expiration of the agreement." The defendant removed 
considerably less than the total amount of fill to which he was entitled, 
and he failed to grade the land properly. 
The plaintiff sued for the entire purchase price plus an amount that 
would compensate him for the expense of grading. The defendant 
argued that to allow the plaintiff to recover the entire price would 
be to enforce a penalty clause, and that he was liable only for the 
difference between the contract price and the reasonable value of the 
fill that he did not take. The Supreme Judicial Court held that even 
if this were the proper measure of damages in the absence of a con-
tractual provision to the contrary, the parties had the right to agree 
as to the measure of damages provided that no penalty was involved. 
The Court then held that this was not the ordinary case in which the 
loss to the plaintiff was only the difference between the contract and 
market price. Here the plaintiff had given up his right to sell the 
gravel to anyone else for a period of twenty months, and he had also 
allowed the defendant to install and store equipment on his land for 
the purpose of removing the gravel. 
§6.3. Arbitration. In a case of first impression under Sections 2 
and 3 of the Uniform Arbitration Act,l the Supreme Judicial Court 
indicated the necessity of strict compliance with both the statute and 
a contractual provision providing for the appointment of an arbitrator. 
The plaintiff in Roberto Construction Co. v. Burnham-Manning Post 
#1105, Veterans of Foreign Wars2 moved that an arbitrator be ap-
pointed to determine the merits of its claim under a construction con-
tract. The contract provided that any disputes arising under the 
contract should be submitted to arbitration upon the written demand 
of either party. Under the provisions of the Standard Form of Arbi-
tration Procedure of the American Institute of Architects, which was 
incorporated into the contract, each party was to appoint one arbitra-
tor and the two so appointed were to appoint a third. 
The trial judge ordered that the parties proceed to arbitration, 
and he appointed an arbitrator. In reversing, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that Section 2(a) of the Uniform Act, which gives the court 
authority to order arbitration, was inapplicable since the plaintiff had 
2347 Mass. 285, 197 N.E.2d 699 (1964). 
§6.3. 1 G.L., c. 251, §§2, 3. 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 705, 198 N.E.2d 302. 
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failed to comply with the conditions giving him a right to arbitration, 
and the defendant had not refused to arbitrate the matter. The Court 
also stressed the importance of Section 3 of the act which provides 
that when the agreement provides a method of appointment of arbi-
trators the agreed upon method should be followed unless it fails. 
Implicit in the Court's holding is the requirement that if the order 
to proceed to arbitration had been proper, the parties should have 
been given an opportunity to select a board of three arbitrators under 
the provisions of the contract instead of being forced to accept the 
one arbitrator appointed by the lower court. 
§6.4. Statute of frauds: Interest in land. Each year a significant 
number of cases involve the statute of frauds. Most of them are 
routine. None require resort to basic theory. A few, however, do 
present exercise for the legal gymnast and provide an opportunity 
either to broaden or to narrow the effect of the statute. One case, 
First National Bank of Boston v. Fairhaven Amusement Co.,1 is 
interesting or dull depending upon how its facts are read. 
The defendant had orally agreed to bid at a judicial foreclosure 
sale for "personal property on which the plaintiff held a chattel 
mortgage and for the interest in a ten-year lease of real estate which 
had been assigned to the plaintiff." The defendant repudiated its 
obligations, the sale was made to a third party, and the plaintiff sued 
for damages. The defendant pleaded the statute of frauds, and the 
trial court directed a verdict on the ground that the contract concerned 
an interest in land and was within the statute. The plaintiff's main 
contention on appeal was that the statute of frauds should not apply 
to a judicial sale. The Supreme Judicial Court correctly refused to 
answer this argument on the ground that even if this were true, the 
exception would not cover this case as the alleged contract was made 
preliminarily to and not at the judicial foreclosure. A contract to 
bid at a judicial sale is not itself under the supervision of the court 
and is covered by the statute if within one of its sections. 
The more interesting aspect of the case is obscured by the ambiguity 
in the Court's description of the contract terms. It is not clear 
whether the plaintiff was to transfer the lease to the defendant as a 
separate transaction or whether the defendant was to bid for the lease 
at the judicial sale and take the assignment from, or at least through, 
the court. The more reasonable interpretation of the facts is that the 
lease was to be sold by the court along with the personal property.2 
If this is true the case stands for the proposition that an agreement to 
bid for land at a sale is a contract for "the sale of lands ... or of any 
interest in or concerning" land. In effect, the Court held that a 
promise to make an offer to purchase land is the equivalent of a 
"contract for sale" of land. 
In view of the fact that the legislature believes that society is bene-
§6.4. 1347 Mass. 243, 197 N.E.2d 607 (1964), also noted in §2.3 supra. 
2 This point is not made clearer by examination of the record or the briefs. 
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fited by invalidation of oral contracts for the sale of land, the Court's 
decision is correct, A promise to offer to purchase land, although 
technically distinct from a contract to purchase land, seems no less 
likely to breed fraud. 
5
Hart: Chapter 6: Contracts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1964
